Russia is losing projects in Central Asia

Russia’s economic influence in Central Asia is beginning to waver. A key pillar of its presence—the financing of major energy and infrastructure projects—appears to be growing increasingly fragile.

For years, the international energy sector has been a reliable lever of Russian foreign economic policy. State-affiliated corporations such as Rosatom and Inter RAO secured lucrative large-scale projects and, with them, political influence. But it is precisely this model that now appears to be reaching its limits: funding gaps are slowing down projects—and opening the door to new players.

The shift is particularly evident in Kazakhstan. There, an energy project originally dominated by Russian interests was awarded to the Chinese conglomerate Harbin Electric International. A key factor was, not least, the failure of Moscow to deliver on its financing commitment. The new contractor also offered significantly more favorable terms—and undercut the original costs by several hundred million dollars.

Russia has lost other projects as well. As early as 2025, the state-owned company Inter RAO had to relinquish several power plant projects in Kazakhstan. The contracts also went to Chinese bidders—a clear indication of the shifting balance of power in the region.

Meanwhile, skepticism toward Russian partners is growing in Uzbekistan. There, the authorities are now exploring alternatives and have engaged the French company Framatome in talks. The focus is on modern technologies and potential cooperation in the construction of nuclear power plants—an area that was previously considered the domain of Russian companies.

This development points to a structural shift: while Russia struggles with financial constraints, other international players are gaining influence. Central Asia is thus increasingly becoming a battleground for economic competition, where the availability of capital is becoming the decisive factor.